Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice
Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice
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DOI：
10.3982/ecta9100
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发表时间：
2011-02
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Fischer
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文献类型：
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作者：
G. Fischer
除了自给自足的创业，很少有小额信贷资助的企业发展壮大。本文考虑了一种可能的解释：现有小额信贷合同的结构可能会阻碍高风险但高预期回报的投资。为了探索这种可能性，我开发了一个理论，将投资选择、非正式风险分担和正式金融合同的模型统一起来。然后，我对印度一家大型小额信贷机构的客户进行了一系列实验，以检验这一理论的预测。这些实验证实了理论上的预测，即连带责任造成了两种低效。首先，借款人搭乘合作伙伴的便车，进行高风险的投资，而不补偿合作伙伴的风险。其次，加入同行监督会过度补偿，导致风险承担和盈利能力大幅下降。股权类融资，即合作伙伴分享更有利可图的项目的好处和风险，克服了这两个低效率，值得在现场进一步测试。
Few microfinance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return investments. To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment choice, informal risk sharing, and formal financial contracts. I then test the predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large microfinance institution in India. The experiments confirm the theoretical predictions that joint liability creates two inefficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on their partners, making risky investments without compensating partners for this risk. Second, the addition of peer-monitoring overcompensates, leading to sharp reductions in risk-taking and profitability. Equity-like financing, in which partners share both the benefits and risks of more profitable projects, overcomes both of these inefficiencies and merits further testing in the field.