Export taxes under Bertrand duopoly
Export taxes under Bertrand duopoly
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伯特兰双头垄断下的出口税
作者：
Roger Clarke;D. Collie
本文分析了具有产品差异化的伯特兰双寡头垄断中的出口税，其中本国公司和外国公司都向第三国市场出口。结果表明，最大收益出口税总是超过最优福利出口税。在出口税的纳什均衡中，拥有低成本企业的国家征收最大的出口税。将伯特兰双头垄断下的结果与古诺双头垄断下的结果进行比较。结果表明，古诺双寡头垄断下的出口补贴或税收的绝对值超过了贝特朗双寡头垄断下的出口税。
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.
高桥，K.；增田，A.：自然。
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