Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property
Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property
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滥用支配地位和知识产权许可
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1302368
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Salant
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Rey;D. Salant
我们研究了一个或多个上游基本知识产权所有者的许可政策对下游产业提供的多样性以及对消费者和社会福利的影响。当上游的基本知识产权垄断者增加许可证数量时，它增加了产品的多样性，增加了消费者的价值，但它也加剧了下游的竞争，从而消耗了利润。因此，上游知识产权垄断者可能希望提供太多或太少的许可证，相对于最大化消费者剩余或社会福利。在多个基本知识产权所有者的情况下，专利使用费叠加增加了总许可费，从而往往限制了被许可人的数量，这也可以降低消费者的下游价格。我们描述了下游价格和品种减少对消费者或社会有利的条件。
We examine the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the variety offered by a downstream industry, as well as on consumers and social welfare. When an upstream monopoly owner of essential IP increases the number of licenses, it enhances product variety, adding to consumer value, but it also intensifies downstream competition, and thus dissipates profits. As a result, the upstream IP monopoly may want to provide too many or too few licenses, relatively to what maximizes consumer surplus or social welfare. With multiple owners of essential IP, royalty stacking increases aggregate licensing fees and thus tends to limit the number of licensees, which can also reduce downstream prices for consumers. We characterize the conditions under which these reductions in downstream prices and variety is beneficial to consumers or society.