Are CFOs’ Trades More Informative Than CEOs’ Trades?
Are CFOs’ Trades More Informative Than CEOs’ Trades?
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DOI：
10.1017/s0022109012000257
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发表时间：
2011-03
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Weimin Wang;Yong‐Chul Shin;Bill Francis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Weimin Wang;Yong‐Chul Shin;Bill Francis
摘要我们研究了首席财务官（CFO）的交易是否比首席执行官（CEO）的交易揭示了更多关于未来股票收益的信息。我们发现，财务总监获得统计和经济上更高的异常回报后，他们购买的公司股票比首席执行官。在1992-2002年期间，首席财务官的平均12个月超额收益率比首席执行官高5%。尽管对风险因素进行了控制，首席财务官的上级表现仍然存在，并且即使在他们的交易公开披露后也持续存在。进一步的分析表明，首席财务官购买与更积极的未来收益惊喜比首席执行官购买，这表明首席财务官纳入更好的未来收益的信息。
Abstract We investigate whether trades made by chief financial officers (CFOs) reveal more information about future stock returns than those by chief executive officers (CEOs). We find that CFOs earn statistically and economically higher abnormal returns following their purchases of company shares than CEOs. During 1992–2002, CFOs earned an average 12-month excess return that is 5% higher than that by CEOs. The superior performance by CFOs occurs notwithstanding controls for risk factors and persists even after their trades are publicly disclosed. Further analysis shows that CFO purchases are associated with more positive future earnings surprises than CEO purchases, suggesting that CFOs incorporate better information about future earnings.