Who Enters into Bilateral Investment Treaties and Do They Have an Impact on Foreign Direct Investment?
Who Enters into Bilateral Investment Treaties and Do They Have an Impact on Foreign Direct Investment?
复制标题
谁签署了双边投资条约？它们对外国直接投资有影响吗？
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Paul L. Baker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul L. Baker
双边投资条约旨在为外国投资者提供东道国国内机构无法提供的保护，以吸引外国直接投资进入东道国。最近的经验文献得出结论，双边投资条约吸引外国直接投资，但与预期相反，它们是东道国机构质量的补充而不是替代。使用一个大的数据集，一个丰富的经验模型，并匹配计量经济学，我表明，双边投资条约吸引外国直接投资，直到20世纪90年代中期，但重要的是，这不再是这种情况。我还表明，除了东道国机构的质量，进入双边投资条约的其他决定因素包括外国直接投资的类型，在东道国投资和经营的成本，预先存在的关系（如殖民关系，共同的语言），以及东道国是否是前苏联的成员。
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are intended to provide protection to foreign investors that is not otherwise available from the host country’s domestic institutions so as to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to the host country. Recent empirical literature has concluded that BITs attract FDI but, contrary to expectations, they serve as a complement rather than a substitute to the quality of host institutions. Using a large data set, a richly specified empirical model, and matching econometrics I show that BITs did attract FDI until the mid-1990s, but, importantly, that is no longer the case. I also show that, in addition to the quality of host institutions, other determinants of entry into a BIT include the type of FDI, costs of investing and operating in the host country, pre-existing relationships (e.g. colonial ties, shared language) and whether the host country is a former member of the Soviet Union.