Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
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DOI：
10.3386/w2387
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发表时间：
1987-09
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Steven M. Fazzari;Bruce C. Petersen;R. Hubbard
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文献类型：
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作者：
Steven M. Fazzari;Bruce C. Petersen;R. Hubbard
大多数投资的经验模型依赖于这样的假设，即公司能够对集中证券市场上设定的价格做出反应(通过“资本成本”或“Q”)。另一种方法强调现金流作为投资支出决定因素的重要性，因为存在“融资等级”，即内部融资相对于外部融资具有重要的成本优势。我们基于最近关于股票和债务市场不完善的研究。这项工作表明，一些公司没有足够的机会进入外部资本市场，使它们无法对资本成本、资产价格或基于税收的投资激励措施的变化做出反应。在企业从外部筹集资金的能力受到限制的程度上，投资支出可能对内部融资的可用性很敏感。也就是说，投资可能对现金流的变动表现出“过度敏感”。在这篇文章中，我们在投资的Q理论范围内工作，并检验了由资本市场不完善创造的融资等级的重要性。使用单个制造业企业的面板数据，我们比较了快速成长的企业在耗尽内部融资的情况下的投资行为，以及成熟企业支付股息的行为。我们发现，与成熟公司相比，没有分红的公司Q值在相当长的一段时间内保持非常高的水平。我们还发现，对于我们的模型所暗示的最有可能面临外部融资约束的公司来说，投资对现金流更敏感。这些结果与我们提出的扩展模型是一致的，该模型考虑了不同企业群体的不同融资制度。最后讨论了对公共政策的一些延伸和启示。
Most empirical models of investment rely on the assumption that firms are able to respond to prices set in centralized securities markets (through the "cost of capital" or "q"). An alternative approach emphasizes the importance of cash flow as a determinant of investment spending, because of a "financing hierarchy," in which internal finance has important cost advantages over external finance. We build on recent research concerning imperfections in markets for equity and debt. This work suggests that some firms do not have sufficient access to external capital markets to enable them to respond to changes in the cost of capital, asset prices, or tax-based investment incentives. To the extent that firms are constrained in their ability to raise funds externally, investment spending may be sensitive to the availability of internal finance. That is, investment may display "excess sensitivity" to movements in cash flow. In this paper, we work within the q theory of investment, and examine the importance of a financing hierarchy created by capital-market imperfections. Using panel data on individual manufacturing firms, we compare the investment behavior of rapidly growing firms that exhaust all of their internal finance with that of mature firms paying dividends. We find that q values remain very high for significant periods of time for firms paying no dividends, relative to those for mature firms. We also find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for the group of firms that our model implies is most likely to face external finance constraints. These results are consistent with the augmented model we propose, which takes into account different financing regimes for different groups of firms. Some extensions and implications for public policy are discussed at the end.