Fault Tolerant Implementation
Fault Tolerant Implementation
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容错实现
DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.t01-1-00023
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Eliaz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Eliaz
在本文中，我们研究了当一些参与者“有缺陷”（即他们未能采取最佳行动）时出现的执行问题。计划者和非错误参与人只知道总体中最多有k个错误参与人。然而，他们既不知道错误玩家的身份，他们的确切人数，也不知道错误玩家的行为。我们定义了一个解决方案概念，它要求玩家对没有错误的玩家做出最佳反应，而不管错误玩家的身份和行为。我们引入了容错实现的概念，与完全实现的标准概念不同，它还需要对偏离平衡的鲁棒性。本文的主要结果证明了在对称信息下，如果至少有3个参与人且错误参与人的数量小于1\2n−1，则任何满足k单调性和无否决权两个性质的选择规则都可以被策略博弈形式实现。作为我们的结果的应用，我们给出了实现约束瓦尔拉斯函数的简单机制的例子和不可分割商品有效分配的选择规则。Wiley-Blackwell版权所有。
In this paper we investigate the implementation problem arising when some of the players are “faulty” in the sense that they fail to act optimally. The planner and the non-faulty players only know that there can be at most k faulty players in the population. However, they know neither the identity of the faulty players, their exact number nor how faulty players behave. We define a solution concept which requires a player to optimally respond to the non-faulty players regardless of the identity and actions of the faulty players. We introduce a notion of fault tolerant implementation, which unlike standard notions of full implementation, also requires robustness to deviations from the equilibrium. The main result of this paper establishes that under symmetric information any choice rule that satisfies two properties—k-monotonicity and no veto power—can be implemented by a strategic game form if there are at least three players and the number of faulty players is less than 1\2n−1. As an application of our result we present examples of simple mechanisms that implement the constrained Walrasian function and a choice rule for the efficient allocation of an indivisible good. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.