Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.101.2.556
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发表时间：
2011-04-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Falk, Armin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dohmen, Thomas;Falk, Armin
本文通过实验室控制实验研究了激励对员工自我选择的影响。受试者面临固定支付方案和可变支付方案之间的选择。根据待遇的不同，可变的报酬是计件工资、锦标赛或收入分成方案。我们发现，与固定支付方案相比，可变支付方案的产出更高。这种差异很大程度上是由生产率排序驱动的。此外，不同的激励方案系统地吸引了具有不同态度的个体，如冒险意愿和相对自我评估以及性别，这突出了多维排序的重要性。（jel c91, d81, d82, j16, j31）
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is a piece rate, a tournament, or a revenue-sharing scheme. We find that output is higher in the variable-payment schemes compared to the fixed-payment scheme. This difference is largely driven by productivity sorting. In addition, different incentive schemes systematically attract individuals with different attitudes, such as willingness to take risks and relative self-assessment as well as gender, which underlines the importance of multidimensional sorting. (JEL C91, D81, D82, J16, J31)