Information, Control, and Organizational Structure
Information, Control, and Organizational Structure
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00237.x
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发表时间：
1992-06
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
D. Baron;David Besanko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Baron;David Besanko
本文研究了组织的设计者（称为监管者）应如何组织生产活动，其中两个不同的单位生产组件，并且每个单位都拥有有关其成本的私人信息。分析了三种组织结构。在第一种情况（信息整合）中，监管机构与生产这两种组件的整合单位签订合同。在第二种（信息去中心化）中，监管者独立地与每个组件的生产商签订合同。在第三种（信息授权）中，监管者与其中一个单位签订合同，该单位又与另一个单位分包。在每种情况下，监管机构的最优机制（包括支付和产出计划）都得到了充分的描述。信息整合和信息分散产生不同的输出时间表。在信息去中心化的情况下，最优产出计划可能不取决于每个组成部分的边际成本之和，但当它依赖时，监管者严格倾向于信息整合而不是信息去中心化。当监管者可以观察到单位之间的契约时，信息授权就相当于信息分散。
This paper investigates how a designer of an organization (referred to as the regulator) should organize a production activity in which two different units produce components and where each unit has private information about its costs. Three organizational structures are analyzed. In the first (informational consolidation), the regulator contracts with a consolidated unit that produces both components. In the second (informational decentralization), the regulator independently contracts with the producer of each component. In the third (informational delegation), the regulator contracts with one of the units, which in turn subcontracts with the other. In each case, the regulator's optimal mechanism consisting of payment and output schedules is fully characterized. Informational consolidation and informational decentralization yield different output schedules. Under informational decentralization, the optimal output schedule may not depend on the sum of the marginal costs of each component, but when it does, the regulator strictly prefers informational consolidation to informational decentralization. Informational delegation is shown to be equivalent to informational decentralization when the regulator can observe the contracting between the units.