Route-cost-assignment with joint user and operator behavior as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game
Route-cost-assignment with joint user and operator behavior as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.trb.2019.04.008
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发表时间：
2017-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Saeid Rasulkhani;Joseph Y. J. Chow
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Saeid Rasulkhani;Joseph Y. J. Chow
我们提出了一个广义的市场均衡模型，使用分配博弈标准来评估由运营商和用户决策组成的运输系统。该模型从广义成本的角度寻找稳定的定价，并在网络中的用户群体与具有线路容量的路由集之间进行匹配。所提出的模型提供了一组稳定的结果，而不是单点定价，允许运营商根据期望的机制或策略设计机票定价，影响进入/出口的路线/时间表，影响等待/转移成本的共享策略等。证明了稳定结果集是凸的，由此可以得到与赋值相关的唯一用户最优和算子最优结果。不同的用户组可以从以规定的方式或在顺序设计过程中使用此模型中获益。我们研究了几个不同的例子来测试我们的模型：固定交通路线的小例子和使用纽约市出租车数据的小子集的案例研究。案例研究说明了如何使用该模型来评估一项政策，该政策可以要求乘客步行到1个街区以外的地方与共享出租车见面，而不会拒绝乘客。
We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators’ and users’ decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and matches between user populations in a network to set of routes with line capacities. The proposed model gives a set of stable outcomes instead of single point pricing that allows operators to design ticket pricing, routes/schedules that impact access/egress, shared policies that impact wait/transfer costs, etc., based on a desired mechanism or policy. The set of stable outcomes is proven to be convex from which assignment-dependent unique user-optimal and operator-optimal outcomes can be obtained. Different user groups can benefit from using this model in a prescriptive manner or within a sequential design process. We look at several different examples to test our model: small examples of fixed transit routes and a case study using a small subset of taxi data in NYC. The case study illustrates how one can use the model to evaluate a policy that can require passengers to walk up to 1 block away to meet with a shared taxi without turning away passengers.