A multi-hazard risk model with cascading failure pathways for the Dawlish (UK) railway using historical and contemporary data
A multi-hazard risk model with cascading failure pathways for the Dawlish (UK) railway using historical and contemporary data
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ijdrr.2021.102082
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发表时间：
2021-04
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Keith Adams;M. Heidarzadeh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keith Adams;M. Heidarzadeh
在2014年的风暴链中，连接伦敦和英国西南部的重要经济铁路中断，造成了高达12亿英镑的经济损失。这一事件强调了迫切需要了解风暴破坏所涉及的多重危害的级联性质。本研究的重点是2014年海堤决口导致铁路关闭两个月的德力士铁路。我们使用历史和当代的恶劣天气损害数据，并使用故障分析来开发铁路的多灾害风险模型。1846年至2014年期间，29起损坏事件导致了重大的线路关闭。对于每个事件，确定了危险，解构了故障序列，并制定了每个事件的流程图，显示了多个危险之间的相互关系及其级联的可能性。确定了最常见的破坏机制：(I)滑坡，（II）直接压舱物冲刷，（III）砌体破坏。我们为铁路开发了一个风险模型，该模型按自上而下的顺序分为五层：(a)根本原因（风暴）；(b)产生力（碎片撞击、波浪撞击、浮顶、超孔隙压力、风撞击）；(c)共同原因的破坏（斜坡不稳、铁路水浸、顶部和胸墙损坏、基础损坏和砖石损坏）；(d)级联破坏（滑坡、压舱物冲刷、上部砌体海堤破坏、填充材料损失），(e)网络故障迫使服务暂停。通过分析这29个主要事件，我们确定了5种不同的失效途径和损伤机制。
The failure of the vital economic railway link between London and the southwest of the United Kingdom in the 2014 storm chain incurred up to £1.2bn of economic losses. This incident highlighted the urgent need to understand the cascading nature of multi hazards involved in storm damage. This study focuses on the Dawlish railway where a seawall breach caused two months of railway closure in 2014. We used historical and contemporary data of severe weather damage and used failure analysis to develop a multi-hazard risk model for the railway. Twenty-nine damage events caused significant line closure in the period 1846–2014. For each event, hazards were identified, the sequence of failures were deconstructed, and a flowchart for each event was formulated showing the interrelationship of multiple hazards and their potential to cascade. The most frequent damage mechanisms were identified: (I) landslide, (II) direct ballast washout, and (III) masonry damage. We developed a risk model for the railway which has five layers in the top-down order of: (a) root cause (storm); (b) force generation (debris impact, wave impact, overtopping, excess pore pressure, wind impacts); (c) common cause failure (slope instability, rail flooding, coping and parapet damage, foundation failure and masonry damage); (d) cascading failure (landslide, ballast washout, upper masonry seawall failure, loss of infill material), and (e) network failure forcing service suspension. We identified five separate failure pathways and damage mechanisms by analysing these 29 major events.