Critical Mass and Network Size with Application to the Us Fax Market
Critical Mass and Network Size with Application to the Us Fax Market
复制标题
应用于美国传真市场的临界质量和网络规模
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.6858
复制
发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Himmelberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Economides;C. Himmelberg
我们分析了替代市场结构下网络的均衡规模。网络的特点是具有正规模的外部性（通常称为“网络外部性”）。也就是说，添加额外节点（或额外客户）的收益超过了特定节点（或客户）所获得的私人收益。这种需求结构的直接后果是完全竞争并不能实现最优结果。由于外部性，存在一系列价格，其中可以支持三种不同网络规模的均衡：零规模网络、不稳定的中间规模网络、以及大型稳定且帕累托最优的网络。我们预计市场将选择三个均衡网络中最大的一个。因此，小型网络将不会被观察到。我们将临界质量称为平衡时可以支持的最小网络的大小。替代分配系统将网络外部性内部化到不同程度，因此导致不同规模的临界质量和价格网络规模路径。福利最大化的规划者支持比完全竞争更大的网络。令人惊讶的是，即使允许影响消费者的期望，垄断者也总是选择比完全竞争时规模更小的网络。兼容网络商品的寡头垄断者支持规模小于完全竞争且大于垄断的网络。我们将我们的成果扩展到动态环境中的耐用品。在行业边际成本呈下降趋势的情况下，网络外部性的存在会增加市场需求的增长速度。我们使用此预测来校准模型，并使用美国传真市场价格和数量的汇总时间序列数据来获得衡量消费者对已安装基础的评估（即网络效应）的参数估计值。
We analyze the equilibrium size of networks under alternative market structures. Networks are characterized by positive size externalities (commonly called "network externalities"). That is, the benefits of the addition of an extra node (or an extra customer) exceed the private benefits accruing to the particular node (or customer). A direct consequence of this demand structure is that perfect competition does not implement the optimal outcome. Because of the externality, there exists a range of prices within which three different network sizes can be supported as equilibria: a zero size network, an intermediate size that is unstable, and a large stable and Pareto optimal one. We expect that the market will select the largest of the three equilibrium networks. As a result, small networks will not observed. We call critical mass the size of the smallest network that can be supported in equilibrium. Alternative allocation systems internalize the network externality to different degrees, and therefore result in a variety of sizes of critical masses and price-network size paths. A welfare-maximizing planner supports a larger network than results in perfect competition. Surprisingly, a monopolist, even if allowed to influence consumers' expectations, always chooses a network of smaller size than in perfect competition. Oligopolists of compatible network goods support networks of smaller size than perfect competition and larger than monopoly. We extend our results to durable goods in a dynamic setting. In the presence of a downward time trend for industry marginal cost, the presence of network externalities increases the speed at which market demand grows. We use this prediction to calibrate the model and obtain estimates of the parameter measuring a consumer's valuation of the installed base (i.e., the network effect) using aggregate time series data on prices and quantities in the US fax market.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
BERRY, S;LEVINSOHN, J;PAKES, A
通讯作者：
PAKES, A