Embodiment, ownership and disownership
Embodiment, ownership and disownership
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DOI：
10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.004
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发表时间：
2011-03-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
de Vignemont, Frederique
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
de Vignemont, Frederique
研究身体所有权感有两种主要途径，(i)通过研究一个物体被体验为自己的体现条件，（ii）通过分析将身体部分体验为异己的患者的缺陷。在这里。我提出，如果E的某些属性和一个人的身体属性一样被处理，那么E就是具身的。但是，必须区分不同类型的体现，只有自我特异性的体现才能产生所有权的感觉。我解决的问题，如功能角色和体现的动态，程度和措施的所有权，和共享的身体表征之间的自我和他人。然后，我分析了所有权和剥夺所有权之间的相互作用。一方面。我指出，没有证据表明在橡胶手错觉中，橡胶手取代了生物手。另一方面，我认为，病人对自己身体部位的剥夺感不能仅仅归结为缺乏所有权。(C) 2010爱思唯尔公司版权所有。
There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here. I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand. I show that there is no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand. On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.