Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games
Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for TU-Games
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DOI：
10.1007/s11238-007-9083-x
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发表时间：
2009-09
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
R. Brink;Yukihiko Funaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Brink;Yukihiko Funaki
有限个局中人通过合作获得一定收益的情形可以用效用可转移的合作博弈或简称为TU-博弈来描述。TU-博弈的（点值）解为每个TU-博弈分配一个支付分布。本文讨论了由CIS-值、ENSC-值和等分解的所有凸组合构成的一类等剩余分配解。我们提供了几个刻画这类解决方案的可变和固定的局中人集。几个属性的规格表征这类特定的解决方案。
A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by acooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.