Anti-counterfeit Integrated Circuits using fuse and tamper-resistant time-stamp circuitry
Anti-counterfeit Integrated Circuits using fuse and tamper-resistant time-stamp circuitry
复制标题
使用保险丝和防篡改时间戳电路的防伪集成电路
DOI：
10.1109/ths.2013.6699051
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Simin Hall
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Avinash R. Desai;D. Ganta;M. Hsiao;L. Nazhandali;Chao Wang;Simin Hall
近年来，伪造集成电路（IC）已经成为重要的安全问题，其中，不正确地执行或低于预期的伪造IC除了给半导体行业带来巨大的经济损失之外，还可能在安全和/或关键任务应用中导致灾难性后果。在本文中，我们提出了两种新的方法来验证的真实性IC。首先，提出了具有电荷泵的保险丝作为IC的“密封”，其中任何功能使用都会破坏密封，并且破坏的密封极难更换。第二，提出了一种新的时间戳，可以提供IC制造的日期。时间戳电路使用线性反馈移位寄存器（LFSR）构建，因此电路的任何微小变化都会导致在遥远的过去或未来产生完全不同的日期，超出典型IC的使用寿命。此外，我们提出了第二层防篡改的时间戳电路，使其更难以修改。结果表明，在AES实现约8.8%的面积开销，对手需要超过10118个不同的尝试，以成功地篡改时间戳电路。这些技术很容易实现，并嵌入到电路使用今天的技术，而极难修改或篡改的对手。最后，该方法可以与附加硬件相结合，以检测电路中的恶意更改。
Counterfeit Integrated Circuits (ICs) have become an important security issue in recent years, in which counterfeit ICs that perform incorrectly or sub-par to the expected can lead to catastrophic consequences in safety and/or mission-critical applications, in addition to the tremendous economic toll they incur to the semiconductor industry. In this paper, we propose two novel methods to validate the authenticity of ICs. First, a fuse with a charge pump is proposed to serve as a “seal” for the IC, in which any functional use will break the seal, and the broken seal is extremely hard to replace. Second, a novel time-stamp is proposed that can provide the date at which the IC was manufactured. The time-stamp circuitry is constructed using a Linear-Feedback Shift-Register (LFSR) such that any small change to the circuit would result in an entirely different date either in a distant past or future, beyond the lifetime of a typical IC. Furthermore, we propose a second layer of tamper resistance to the time-stamp circuit to make it even more difficult to modify. Results show that with about 8.8% area overhead in AES implementation, the adversary requires more than 10118 different trials to successfully tamper time-stamp circuit. These techniques are easy to implement and embed into the circuit using todays technologies, while extremely difficult to modify or tamper with by the adversary. Finally, the method can be combined with additional hardware to detect malicious alteration made in the circuit.