Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders
Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
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发表时间：
1961-03
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
W. Vickrey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Vickrey
AP Lerner在他的《控制经济学》一书中提出了一个有趣的建议，即在市场不完全竞争的情况下，一个国家机构通过“反投机”可能能够创造条件，从而维持有效资源配置的边际条件。不幸的是，人们并不清楚这种反投机将如何进行，对许多人来说，这一术语只是指经济学家的思想橱柜中又一个吱吱作响的空盒子。自从控制经济学首次出现以来，似乎没有人试图批判性地检查这个被贴上有趣标签的盒子实际上可能包含什么。在第一节中，我们将进一步研究这个反投机盒子；事实证明，在这个标题下最直接暗示自己的大多数工具，就它们对国家财政资源的要求而言，相对于实现的净收益来说，都是异常昂贵的，至少在所讨论的商品是精细可分的情况下是这样。第二节研究了另一种极端情况，即只有一个不可分割的物品需要分配；在这种情况下，在参与者人数有限的市场上达成最佳解决办法的可能性变得大得多：可以证明，普通或累进拍卖比倒退拍卖或“荷兰”拍卖提供了更好的最佳分配机会。第三节审查了这些调查结果对更重要的案件的影响，这些案件是通过竞争性投标或投标方式出租合同或销售的；分析表明，对这些领域的现行做法进行某些修改，更具体地说，使授标价格等于第二高(或最低)出价而不是最高出价，可能被证明总体上有利于改善资源的分配，而不会像乍看起来那样损害卖方(或买方)的利益。第四节涉及比较复杂和一般的情况，其中有几件相同的物品要拍卖，第五节涉及第四节中得出的概念在销售中的适用问题
IN HIS Economics of Control, AP Lerner threw out an interesting suggestion that where markets are imperfectly competitive, a state agency, through" counterspeculation," might be able to create the conditions whereby the marginal conditions for efficient resource allocation could be maintained. Unfortunately, it was not made clear just how this counterspeculation was to be carried out, and to many this term denotes just one more of the empty boxes that rattle around in the economist's cupboard of ideas. And there appears to have been, in the years since Economics of Control first appeared, no attempt to examine critically just what this intriguingly labeled box might in fact contain.In Section I this counterspeculation box will be further examined; it turns out that most of the devices that most immediately suggest themselves under this heading prove to be inordinately expensive in terms of their demands on the fiscal resources of the state relative to the net benefits to be realized, at least where the commodity in question is finely divisible. The other extreme case, where there is only a single indivisible item to be allocated, is examined in Section II; in this case the possibilities for reaching an optimum solution in a market with a limited number of participants become considerably brighter: the common or progressive type of auction can be shown to provide better chances for optimal allocation than the regressive or" Dutch" auction. The implications of these findings for the inore significant cases where contracts are let or sales made by competitive bids or tenders are examined in Section III; the analysis reveals a likelihood that certain modifications of current practices in these areas, more specifically by making the award price equal to the second highest (or lowest) bid price rather than the highest bid price, might prove generally beneficial in improving the allocation of resources without being as prejudicial to the interests of sellers (or buyers) as might at first seem to be the case. Section IV deals with the somewhat more complicated and general class of cases where there are several identical items to be auctioned, and Section V deals with the application of the concepts derived in Section IV to the sale