Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
复制标题
计算游戏中的顺序均衡
DOI：
10.1145/3340232
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Pass, Rafael
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Halpern, Joseph Y.;Pass, Rafael
我们在计算游戏（Halpern and Pass 2015）的背景下研究了序列均衡，其中代理人对计算收费。在这样的博弈中，智能体可以理性地选择遗忘，因此出现了不完美回忆的问题。在这种情况下，我们考虑两个概念的序列均衡。一种是anex antenotion，即参与人在博弈开始前选择策略，并致力于此，但选择的方式使其即使偏离均衡路径也保持最优;另一种是anacromnotion，即参与人可以在每个信息集上重新考虑他是否在做“正确”的事情，如果不是，可以改变他的策略。这两个概念在完美回忆游戏中一致，但在不完美回忆游戏中不一致。虽然过渡概念似乎更有吸引力，但在一篇配套文章中（Halpern and Pass 2016），我们认为在不完美回忆的标准游戏中，它存在一些深层次的概念问题。我们发现，概念问题在很大程度上消失在计算环境中。此外，在这种情况下，在自然假设下，这两个概念是一致的。
We examine sequential equilibrium in the context ofcomputational games(Halpern and Pass 2015), where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is anex antenotion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is committed to it, but chooses it in such a way that it remains optimal even off the equilibrium path. The second is aninterimnotion, where a player can reconsider at each information set whether he is doing the “right” thing, and if not, can change his strategy. The two notions agree in games of perfect recall, but not in games of imperfect recall. Although the interim notion seems more appealing, in a companion article (Halpern and Pass 2016), we argue that there are some deep conceptual problems with it in standard games of imperfect recall. We show that the conceptual problems largely disappear in the computational setting. Moreover, in this setting, under natural assumptions, the two notions coincide.