Is Japan Really a "Buy"? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies

Is Japan Really a "Buy"? The Corporate Governance, Cash Holdings and Economic Performance of Japanese Companies
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DOI:
10.1111/jbfa.12235
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发表时间:
2017-03-01
影响因子:
2.9
通讯作者:
Skinner, Douglas J.
Skinner, Douglas J.
中科院分区:
管理学4区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Kato, Kazuo;Li, Meng;Skinner, Douglas J.

文献摘要

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我们调查了日本备受吹捧的治理改革是否改善了企业的现金管理、经济业绩和估值。与2000年以来的治理改善相一致,日本企业持有的现金减少,并增加了对股东的支付。业绩的改善与(过剩)现金的减少、传统上处于横向经连会中心的银行影响力的减少以及管理层和外国投资者持股的增加有关。20世纪90年代,日本企业持有的现金的市场价值低于美国企业,但在21世纪初,日本企业持有的现金的市场价值上升到接近美国企业的水平。总的来说,证据表明,在那些改革其治理实践的日本公司中,业绩有所改善。这些发现对中国、印度和韩国等其他亚洲经济体也有影响,这些国家正在讨论改善治理是否能提高公司业绩和估值。
We investigate whether Japan's much-touted governance reforms improve its firms' management of cash, economic performance and valuation. Consistent with an improvement in governance since 2000, Japanese firms hold less cash and increase payouts to shareholders. Improvements in performance are associated with reductions in (excess) cash, reductions in the influence of the banks that traditionally sit at the center of horizontal keiretsu, and increases in the holdings of management and foreign investors. The market valuation of Japanese firms' cash holdings was lower than for US firms during the 1990s but increased to levels closer to those of US firms in the 2000s. Collectively, the evidence suggests that performance improves in those Japanese companies that reform their governance practices. These findings have implications for other Asian economies, such as China, India and Korea, where there are ongoing discussions of whether improved governance can increase firm performance and valuation.