Do Takeover Targets Overinvest

Do Takeover Targets Overinvest
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收购目标是否过度投资

DOI:
10.1093/rfs/7.2.253
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发表时间:
1994
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
H. Servaes
H. Servaes
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
H. Servaes

文献摘要

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我研究的资本支出的样本700收购目标和公司私有化在1972年至1987年期间。对于完整的样本,我没有发现证据表明,收购目标增加了他们的资本支出在收购前的四年期间,或他们过度投资于资本支出相对于几个基准。子样本的结果提供了一些证据,过度投资的石油和天然气公司和大公司。然而,对于被恶意收购的公司或私有化的公司来说,没有证据表明存在过度投资。一般来说,这些结果是不一致的猜想,收购的动机是需要减少过度投资的资本支出在目标公司。牛津大学出版社代表金融研究学会在其期刊《金融研究评论》上发表的文章。
I examine the capital expenditures of a sample of 700 takeover targets and firms that went private over the period 1972-1987. For the complete sample, I do not find evidence that takeover targets increase their capital expenditures over the four-year period before the acquisition or that they overinvest in capital expenditures relative to several benchmarks. Subsample results provide some evidence of overinvestment in oil and gas firms and large firms. There is no evidence of overinvestment, however, for firms acquired in a hostile takeover or firms that went private. In general, these results are not consistent with the conjecture that takeovers are motivated by the need to reduce excess investment in capital expenditures in target firms. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.