Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies

Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies
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社会和经济互动的动态过程:论低效率的持续存在

DOI:
10.1086/429136
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发表时间:
2001
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
P. Jehiel
P. Jehiel
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Armando Gomes;P. Jehiel

文献摘要

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考虑了一个有限数量的代理人和有限数量的国家的经济。一个外生的制度规则规定了从一个国家到另一个国家的移动对每个联盟都是可行的。在每一次,一个代理人被要求以某种外生概率采取行动,他选择一个联盟,一个可行的新状态,以推动经济,并在联盟中的代理人之间支付。该设置可以应用于各种动态过程的社会和经济互动,如立法讨价还价,联盟的形成,或交换经济。当代理人不能写长期合同,但在他们写任意现货合同的能力和他们串通的能力方面都不受约束时,可能会有长期的低效率(周期或低效率的稳定状态)。然而,当代理人有足够的耐心时,过程开始的初始状态从长远来看并不起作用。此外,当存在一个没有负外部性的有效状态时(从这个意义上说,离开那个状态不会伤害那些不需要同意的行为人),系统必须在长期内收敛到这个有效状态。因此,更重要的是设计制度,保证一个有效的无负外部性的国家的存在,而不是实施一个良好的初始化过程。
An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time, an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a coalition, a feasible new state to move the economy to, and side payments between the agents in the coalition. The setup can be applied to various dynamic processes of social and economic interactions such as legislative bargaining, coalition formation, or exchange economies. Whenever agents are unable to write long‐term contracts, but are otherwise unconstrained both in their ability to write arbitrary spot contracts and in their ability to collude, there can be long‐run inefficiencies (with cycles or inefficient steady states). However, when agents are sufficiently patient, the initial state from which the process starts plays no role in the long run. Moreover, when there exists an efficient state that is free of negative externalities (in the sense that a move away from that state does not hurt the agents whose consent is not required for the move), the system must converge to this efficient state in the long run. It is thus more important to design institutions guaranteeing the existence of an efficient negative externality–free state than to implement a fine initialization of the process.