Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems
Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems
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市场和监管阻碍问题
DOI：
10.1006/jeem.1998.1063
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
A. Glazer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Gersbach;A. Glazer
许多监管项目，如环境监管，只有在公司进行不可逆转的投资以降低合规成本的情况下才有效。因此，可能受到监管的公司可能会通过不投资来采取战略行为，从而迫使监管机构废除拟议中的监管。我们表明，当政府的唯一工具是征收排放税时，这种类似于拖延问题的激励措施可能无法克服。通过发放可交易许可证，可以克服滞留问题。存在一个时间一致的均衡，所有公司都在投资，政府实施监管，即使没有许可证交易，它们的市场价格很低。事实上，没有贸易的观察可能表明，减少污染是巨大的。
Many regulatory programs such as environmental regulation are effective only if firms make irreversible investments that reduce the cost of compliance. A firm potentially subject to regulation may therefore behave strategically by not investing, thereby forcing the regulator to void the proposed regulation. We show that such incentives, which resemble a hold-up problem, may not be overcome when government’s only tool is the imposition of an emissions tax. The hold-up problem can be overcome by the issuance of tradeable permits. A time-consistent equilibrium exists with all firms investing and the government imposing regulations, even if no permits are traded and their market price is low. Indeed, an observation of no trade may indicate that pollution abatement is great.