Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators
Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators
复制标题
廉价贿赂与腐败禁令：理性立法者之间的协调博弈
DOI：
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发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Ramseyer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Rasmusen;J. Ramseyer
现代民主国家的立法者（a）接受的贿赂与他们通过的法规的价值相比是很小的，（B）允许禁止贿赂的禁令得到执行。在我们的贿赂模型中，理性的立法者接受的贿赂不仅小于贿赂者获得的利益，而且小于立法者接受贿赂所产生的成本。立法者不愿冒这个风险，他们可能愿意完全禁止贿赂。立法机构的规模、选民信息的质量、党组织的性质以及委员会的结构都会影响贿赂的频率和规模。
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.