Market equilibria and interactions between strategic generation, wind, and storage

Market equilibria and interactions between strategic generation, wind, and storage
复制标题

DOI:
10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.10.035
复制
发表时间:
2017-11
期刊:
影响因子:
11.2
通讯作者:
A. Shahmohammadi;R. Sioshansi;A. Conejo;S. Afsharnia
A. Shahmohammadi;R. Sioshansi;A. Conejo;S. Afsharnia
中科院分区:
工程技术1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Shahmohammadi;R. Sioshansi;A. Conejo;S. Afsharnia

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

不断增加的风能穿透能力可能会取代成本更高的常规发电,从而压低批发能源价格。风能受到这种价格抑制的影响不成比例,因为当风能可获得性较高时,价格受到的抑制最大,这阻碍了风电投资的激励。缓解这种价格抑制的一种方法是风电行使市场力量,这会带来效率损失。另一种选择是使用储能,这样可以在风能利用率高的时候储存能量。在风能可获得性较低、电价较高的情况下,这些储能随后被释放。本文提出了一个两层均衡模型来研究储能与风能和常规发电机之间的市场均衡相互作用。我们用一个带有均衡约束的均衡问题来表示市场的相互作用。通过一个典型的案例研究,展示了以这种方式使用储能的社会福利和效益。
Rising wind penetrations can suppress wholesale energy prices by displacing higher-cost conventional generation from the merit order. Wind suffers disproportionately from this price suppression, because the price is most suppressed when wind availability is high, hindering wind-investment incentives. One way to mitigate this price suppression is by wind exercising market power, which introduces efficiency losses. An alternative is to use energy storage, which allows energy to be stored when wind availability is high. This stored energy is later discharged when wind availability is lower and prices are higher.This paper proposes a bilevel equilibrium model to study market equilibrium interactions between energy storage and wind and conventional generators. We represent the market interaction using an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. An illustrative case study is used to demonstrate the social welfare and profit benefits of using energy storage in this manner.