Nanopyramid: An Optical Scrambler Against Backside Probing Attacks
Nanopyramid: An Optical Scrambler Against Backside Probing Attacks
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Nanopyramid：针对背面探测攻击的光学扰频器
DOI：
10.31399/asm.cp.istfa2018p0280
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Domenic Forte
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Haoting Shen;Domenic Forte
从集成电路(IC)背面进行光学探测是一种强大的故障分析技术，但当掌握在攻击者手中时，会引发严重的安全问题。例如，使用激光电压探测(LVP)的攻击允许直接读取IC中存储和/或处理的敏感信息。虽然已经提出了一些基于传感器的针对背面光学探测攻击的对策，但开销(制造成本和/或面积)是相当可观的。在这篇文章中，我们介绍了纳米棱锥体结构，它通过扰乱激光脉冲反射的测量来缓解光学探测攻击。纳米棱锥体结构被应用于IC内部需要防止光学探测攻击的选定区域。纳米yramids的制造是与cmos兼容的，并且已经很好地应用于光伏应用。我们设计了集成电路中的纳米棱锥体结构，建立了LVP攻击模型，并进行了光学仿真，分析了纳米棱锥体对LVP的影响。根据仿真结果，纳米棱锥体可以干扰光学测量，使得LVP攻击实际上是不可行的。此外，我们的纳米棱镜对抗没有面积开销，工作在被动模式下，不消耗任何能量。
Optical probing from the backside of an integrated circuit (IC) is a powerful failure analysis technique but raises serious security concerns when in the hands of attackers. For instance, attacks using laser voltage probing (LVP) allow direct reading of sensitive information being stored and/or processed in the IC. Although a few sensor-based countermeasures against backside optical probing attacks have been proposed, the overheads (fabrication cost and/or area) are considerable. In this paper, we introduce nanopyramid structures that mitigate optical probing attacks by scrambling the measurements reflected by a laser pulse. Nanopyramid structure is applied to selected areas inside an IC that requires protection against optical probing attacks. The fabrication of nanopyramids is CMOS compatible and well established for photovoltaic applications. We design the nanopyramid structure in ICs, develop the LVP attacking model, and perform optical simulations to analyze the impact of nanopyramids on LVP. According to the simulation results, the nanopyramid can disturb the optical measurements enough to make LVP attacks practically infeasible. In addition, our nanopyramid countermeasure has no area overheads and works in a passive mode without consuming any energy.