A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
A Bargaining Model of the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
复制标题
公共支出纯理论的讨价还价模型
DOI：
10.1086/259722
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发表时间：
1971
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
H. Shibata
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Shibata
本文引入了一种类似于双边垄断的公共产品的几何分析，论证了这两种理论的本质同一性。然后对各种公共财政理论进行了说明：阐明了它们的基本但往往模棱两可的观点，并揭示了隐含的假设，以表明它们不同的隐含行为假设在很大程度上导致了它们的分歧。研究发现，在通常的行为假设下，不可能自发地得到唯一的最优解，但可以确定一组唯一的可能解。研究最优预算讨价还价方案的理论家们迄今忽视了收入再分配效应的重要性，这一点也得到了论证。
This paper introduces a geometric analysis of public goods very similar to that of bilateral monopoly, demonstrating the essential identity of the two theories. Various public-finance theories are then illustrated: Their basic but often vaguely outlined ideas are elucidated, and implicit assumptions are unveiled in order to show that their different implicit behavioral assumptions are largely responsible for their disagreements. It is found that, under the usual behavioral assumptions, a unique optimum solution cannot be attained spontaneously, but a unique set of possible solutions can be delimited. The importance of income-redistribution effects, hitherto neglected by theorists examining the bargaining solution for an optimum budget, is also demonstrated.