Preserving Physical Safety Under Cyber Attacks
Preserving Physical Safety Under Cyber Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/jiot.2018.2889866
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发表时间：
2019-08
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
Fardin Abdi;Chien-Ying Chen;M. Hasan;Songran Liu;Sibin Mohan;M. Caccamo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fardin Abdi;Chien-Ying Chen;M. Hasan;Songran Liu;Sibin Mohan;M. Caccamo
构成网络物理系统 (CPS) 核心的物理工厂通常具有严格的安全要求，最近的攻击表明网络入侵可能会对这些工厂造成损害。在本文中，我们演示了即使平台受到损害，如何确保物理工厂的安全。我们利用这样一个事实：由于物理惯性，对手无法立即破坏工厂的稳定（即使完全控制软件）。事实上，这通常需要有限的（甚至相当长的时间）。本文提供了一个分析框架，利用该特性来计算运行时的安全操作窗口，在此期间保证工厂的安全。为了确保运行时计算的正确性，我们讨论了两种方法来确保在不受信任的环境中这些计算的完整性：1）与信任根计时器相结合的完全平台范围重新启动；2）利用硬件中可用的受信任执行环境功能。我们使用两个现实系统（一架 3 自由度直升机和一个模拟仓库温度管理单元）演示了我们的方法，并表明我们的系统能够抵御多种模拟攻击，本质上攻击者无法损害 CPS 的安全。
Physical plants that form the core of the cyber-physical systems (CPSs) often have stringent safety requirements and, recent attacks have shown that cyber intrusions can cause damage to these plant. In this paper, we demonstrate how to ensure the safety of the physical plant even when the platform is compromised. We leverage the fact that due to physical inertia, an adversary cannot destabilize the plant (even with complete control over the software) instantaneously. In fact, it often takes finite (even considerable time). This paper provides the analytical framework that utilizes this property to compute safe operational windows in run-time during which the safety of the plant is guaranteed. To ensure the correctness of the computations in runtime, we discuss two approaches to ensure the integrity of these computations in an untrusted environment: 1) full platform-wide restarts coupled with a root-of-trust timer and 2) utilizing trusted execution environment features available in hardware. We demonstrate our approach using two realistic systems—a 3 degree-of-freedom helicopter and a simulated warehouse temperature management unit and show that our system is robust against multiple emulated attacks—essentially the attackers are not able to compromise the safety of the CPS.