Introduction: Paraconsistent logics
Introduction: Paraconsistent logics
复制标题
简介:次一致逻辑
DOI:
10.1007/bf00935736
复制
发表时间:
1984
期刊:
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
R. Routley
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
G. Priest;R. Routley
Let Ih be a relation of logical consequence. Ih may be defined either semantically (27 lh A holds iff for some specified set of valuations, wherever all the formulas in E are true under an evaluation, so is A) or proof theoreti? cally (E Ih A holds iff for some specified set of rules, there is a derivation of A, all of whose (undischarged) premises are in E), or in some other way. lh is explosive iff for all A and B {A,~ A} ih B. It is paraconsistent iff it is not explosive. A logic is paraconsistent iff its logical consequence relation is0.Let E be a set of sentences. E is inconsistent iff, for some A,{A,~ A} c E. E is trivial iff for all B, B e E. The important fact about pa? aconsis tent logics is that they provide the basis for inconsistent but non-trivial theories. In other words, there are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence which are inconsistent but non-trivial. This fact is sometimes taken as an alternative definition of'paraconsistent'and, given that logical consequence is transitive, it is equivalent to our definition. 1 For this reason we call inconsistent but non-trivial theories paraconsistent The equivalence indicates one reason why paraconsistent logics are worthy of study. For there are important inconsistent theories which are not trivial. Any analysis of their logical structure must therefore be done using a paraconsistent logic. Clearly, to adopt an explosive logic such as Frege/Eussell or intuitionist logic would trivialise them.