Can phronesis save the life of medical ethics?
Can phronesis save the life of medical ethics?
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DOI：
10.1007/bf00489446
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发表时间：
1996-09-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Beresford, EB
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Beresford, EB
自从Jonsen和Toulmin的开创性工作以来，人们对生物学的兴趣越来越大。在他们看来，偶然性提供了确保政策制定者所期望的道德协议的可能性，但这已被证明是理论驱动的伦理方法所难以实现的。然而，他们对智慧的解释依赖于实践智慧的运用。正如最近关于实践经验的讨论所表明的那样，这不仅需要注意案件的细节，而且需要注意案件中所涉及的实质性货物。如果不就这些商品达成一致，对案例的关注就不太可能获得琼森和图尔明所寻求的富有成效的共识。
There has been a growing interest in casuistry since the ground breaking work of Jonsen and Toulmin. Casuistry, in their view, offers the possibility of securing the moral agreement that policy makers desire but which has proved elusive to theory driven approaches to ethics. However, their account of casuistry is dependent upon the exercise of phronesis. As recent discussions of phronesis make clear, this requires attention not only to the particulars of the case, but also to the substantive goods at stake in the case. Without agreement on these goods attention to cases is unlikely to secure the productive consensus that Jonson and Toulmin seek.