The evolution of cooperation
The evolution of cooperation
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DOI：
10.2307/2392957
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发表时间：
1981-07
期刊：
影响因子：
64.8
通讯作者：
Robert M. May
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Robert M. May
自达尔文以来，无论是细菌还是灵长类，生物体之间的合作一直是进化论的一个难题。假设成对的个体之间的相互作用发生在概率的基础上，一个模型的基础上的概念的进化稳定的策略的囚徒困境游戏的背景下。从模型中推导出的结果，以及计算机比赛的结果显示，基于互惠的合作如何在一个反社会的世界中开始，如何在与各种其他策略互动的同时蓬勃发展，以及如何在完全建立后抵御入侵。潜在的应用包括领土，交配和疾病的具体方面。
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.