Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations
Evolutionary fate of memory-one strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma game in structured populations
复制标题
结构化人群中重复囚徒困境博弈中记忆一策略的进化命运
DOI：
10.1140/epjb/e2017-80219-0
复制
发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Guan Jian Yue
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Liu Xu Sheng;Wu Zhi Xi;Chen Michael Z Q;Guan Jian Yue
We study evolutionary spatial prisoner’s dilemma game involving a one-step memory mechanism of the individuals whenever making strategy updating. In particular, during the process of strategy updating, each individual keeps in mind all the outcome of the action pairs adopted by himself and each of his neighbors in the last interaction, and according to which the individuals decide what actions they will take in the next round. Computer simulation results imply that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy win out of the memory-one strategy set in the stationary state. This result is robust in a large range of the payoff parameter, and does not depend on the initial state of the system. Furthermore, theoretical analysis with mean field and quasi-static approximation predict the same result. Thus, our studies suggest that win-stay-lose-shift like strategy is a stable dominant strategy in repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in homogeneous structured populations.
