Adaptive Chosen-Message Side-Channel Attacks
Adaptive Chosen-Message Side-Channel Attacks
复制标题
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-13708-2_12
复制
发表时间：
2010-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon;François-Xavier Standaert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Nicolas Veyrat-Charvillon;François-Xavier Standaert
在公开文献中发表的大多数侧信道攻击假设已知或选择消息对抗场景。本文分析了通过自适应选择消息来提高攻击效率的方法。为此，我们首先描述一种允许攻击者利用此功能的通用策略。我们表明，它可以应用于任何差分功率或电磁分析攻击，针对未受保护或受保护的设备，并利用剖面或非剖面泄漏模型。然后，我们提供了各种实验来量化这些改进。最后，我们讨论了我们的策略的最优性及其对防泄漏加密硬件安全评估的影响。
Most side-channel attacks that have been published in the open literature assume known- or chosen-message adversarial scenarios. In this paper, we analyze the increase of the attacks’ efficiencies that can be obtained by adaptively selecting the messages. For this purpose, we first describe a generic strategy that allows an adversary to take advantage of this capability. We show that it can be applied to any differential power or electromagnetic analysis attack, against unprotected or protected devices and exploiting profiled or non-profiled leakage models. Then, we provide various experiments to quantify these improvements. Finally, we discuss the optimality of our strategy and its implications for the security evaluation of leakage-resilient cryptographic hardware.