Using the Spatial Distribution of Bidders to Detect Collusion in the Marketplace: Evidence from Timber Auctions
Using the Spatial Distribution of Bidders to Detect Collusion in the Marketplace: Evidence from Timber Auctions
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9787.2008.00557.x
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发表时间：
2008-05
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Michael K. Price
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文献类型：
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作者：
Michael K. Price
这项研究开发了利用空间竞价模式来检测拍卖市场中可能存在的串通的识别策略。识别战略被应用于使用从1996-2000年期间不列颠哥伦比亚省近3,000次拍卖(10,000多次单独投标)中获得的数据来审查投标人的行为。结果表明，观察到的行为模式与完全竞争竞标模型不一致。此外，地理空间中这种模式的变化与先前关于溢出效应的经验性研究报告的知识传播的衰退模式非常一致。版权所有(C)Blackwell出版公司，2008
This study develops identification strategies utilizing spatial bidding patterns to detect possible collusion in auction markets. The identification strategy is applied to examine bidder behavior using data drawn from nearly 3,000 auctions (over 10,000 individual bids) for cutting rights of standing timber in British Columbia for the period 1996-2000. Results suggest that observed patterns of behavior are inconsistent with a model of perfectly competitive bidding. Further, changes in such patterns across geographic space are remarkably consistent with patterns of decay in the transmission of knowledge reported in previous empirical work on spillovers. Copyright (c) Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2008