Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature
Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature
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纯粹表现主义与混合表现主义以及传统含义之谜
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
S. Barker
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作者：
S. Barker
规约含义是规约的，它是语言意义和语境的函数，就像真值条件内容一样。然而，尽管在这个意义上是常规的，它对真值条件没有贡献。相反，它引入了一个语用预设。隐含内容的传递是以未说的方式进行的。我们应该如何准确地理解这种模式将在下文中引起我们的极大关注。价值混杂论者可以利用规约含义句的假定特征来构建价值句理论。这种方法被称为传统的含义理论，或IT。1对于IT，价值句是双内容句，就像（1）是。在产生一个价值话语时，比如O是好的，说话者U说O有F，因为某种自然属性F，并且通常暗示对F事物的认可--或者F的实例化，等等。所以这样的句子的双重内容形式是：
Conventional implicature is conventional in the sense that it is a function of linguistic meaning and context in the way that truth-conditional content is. Nevertheless, although conventional in this sense it makes no contribution to truth-conditions. Rather it introduces a pragmatic presupposition. The delivery of content in implicature is in the mode of the unsaid. How exactly we should understand this mode will concern us greatly below. The value hybridist can use the putative features of conventional-implicature bearing sentences to fashion a theory of value-sentences. Call this approach the conventional implicature theory, or IT.1 For IT, value-sentences are dual-content sentences, just like (1) is. In producing a value-utterance, like O is good, the speaker U says that O has F, for some natural property F, and conventionally implicates approval of F-things—or instantiation of F, etc. So the dual-content form of such sentences is: