Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
复制标题
DOI：
10.2307/2555518
复制
发表时间：
1984-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Baron;David Besanko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Baron;David Besanko
本文分析了一个模型，一个受监管的公司，更好地了解其成本函数比监管机构。然而，通过成本审计，监管者被认为能够观察到公司的已实现成本。如果监管机构“发现”该公司在定价时虚报了成本，他可以下令向消费者退款。在最优政策中，当公司出于定价目的报告其成本将很高时，监管机构进行审计，当监管机构发现已实现的成本低于原始报告的预期时，监管机构下令退款。一个重要案例的分离结果表明初始定价决策与审计决策是独立的。然而，审计决定取决于最初设定的价格。最优审计策略的特点和福利收益的性质被确定。在分析中使用的方法涉及到一个事后可观察的启示游戏的均衡的特性。
This article analyzes a model of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function than is the regulator. By auditing at a cost, however, the regulator is assumed to be able to observe the realized cost of the firm. If the regulator 'finds" that the firm had misrepresented its costs at the time at which prices were set, he can order a refund to consumers. In the optimal policy the regulator audits when the firm reports for pricing purposes that its costs will be high and orders a refund when the auditfinds that realized costs are lower than anticipated, given the original report. A separation result that obtains for an important case indicates that the initial pricing decision is independent of the auditing decision. The auditing decision, however, depends on the price that was initially set. The optimal auditing strategy is characterized and the nature of the welfare gains are identified. The methodology used in the analysis involves the characterization of an equilibrium of a revelation game with an ex post observable.