LAYOFFS AND LEMONS
LAYOFFS AND LEMONS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1086/298273
复制
发表时间：
1991-10-01
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
KATZ, LF
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
GIBBONS, R;KATZ, LF
我们提供了一个非对称信息模型的裁员的理论和实证分析。当企业可以自由决定解雇谁时，市场会推断被解雇的工人能力低下。假设如果工人在工厂关闭时被转移，则不需要这样的负面推论，那么与那些因工厂关闭而被转移的工人相比，那些因裁员而被转移的工人的转移后工资应该更低，转移后失业时间应该更长，但转移前工资不应该因转移的原因而不同。来自当前人口调查的失业工人的证据支持我们模型的所有三个预测。
We provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an asymmetric-information model of layoffs. When firms have discretion with respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of low ability. Assuming that no such negative inference is warranted if workers are displaced in a plant closing, postdisplacement wages should be lower and postdisplacement unemployment spells should be longer for those displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings, but predisplacement wages should not differ by cause of displacement. Evidence on displaced workers from Current Population Surveys supports all three of our model's predictions.