Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment

Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment
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两侧匹配的离散和连续模型的稳定结果:统一处理

DOI:
10.12660/bre.v16n21996.2873
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发表时间:
1996
期刊:
Brazilian Review of Econometrics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Marilda Sotomayor
Marilda Sotomayor
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Roth;Marilda Sotomayor

文献摘要

被引文献

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本文给出了一类双边匹配模型的统一处理方法,其中包括离散模型(如Gale和Shapley的婚姻模型)和连续模型(如Shapley和Shubik的分配模型和Demange和Gale的广义分配模型).与以往的处理方法不同,本文从相同的假设出发,以相同的方式得出了两套模型的平行结论。我们表明,所有的结果将问题密切遵循的假设,核心一致的核心定义的弱控制。在婚姻模型中,严格偏好的假设导致这两个集合重合,而在连续模型中,这两个集合重合,因为代理人有连续的偏好,价格可以连续调整。
We present a unified treatment of a class of two-sided matching models that includes discrete models (such as the marriage model of Gale and Shapley) and continuous models (such as the assignmnent model of Shapley aud Shubik and the generalized assignment model of Demange aud Gale). In contrast with previous, treatments, the parallel conclusions for the two sets of models are derived here in the same way from the same assumptions. We show that the results ill question all follow closely from the assumptions that the core coincides with the core defined by weak domination. In the marriage model, the assumption of strict preferences causes these two sets to coincide, while in the continuous models the two sets coincide because agents have continuous preferences and prices can be adjusted continuously.