Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity Under Ex Post Opportunism
Safeguarding Interorganizational Performance and Continuity Under Ex Post Opportunism
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.49.12.1684.25112
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发表时间：
2003-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sandy D. Jap;E. Anderson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sandy D. Jap;E. Anderson
货币主义是交换理论中的一个核心概念。经济学家认为，尽管公司尽最大努力建立治理结构，减少机会主义和保护结果，但一旦交易到位，总有一些机会主义仍然存在。尽管如此，很少有研究系统地调查这种事后机会主义存在下的关系属性的安全保护功效。在这项研究中，我们开发了一个理论框架，并提供了一个纵向测试的能力，各种关系的保障措施，以保持性能的结果和未来的期望给予不同程度的事后机会主义的关系。我们对300多名采购商和供应商的调查结果表明，在机会主义水平较低的情况下，双边特质投资和人际信任会提高绩效结果和未来预期，而目标一致性则没有明显的影响。然而，在更高水平的机会主义，目标一致性成为一个更强大的保障，而人际信任变得不那么有效。双边特质投资继续保持业绩成果和未来的预期，即使在更高水平的机会主义。组织间联盟的长期管理的影响进行了讨论。
Opportunism is a central construct in exchange theory. Economists contend that despite the firm's best efforts to erect governance structures that reduce opportunism and preserve outcomes, there is always some opportunism that remains once the transaction is in place. Despite this, there are few studies that systematically investigate thesafeguarding efficacy of relationship attributes in the presence of such ex post opportunism. In this research, we develop a theoretical framework and provide a longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations given varying levels of ex post opportunism in the relationship. Our survey results from over 300 buyers and suppliers indicates that given lower levels of opportunism, bilateral idiosyncratic investments and interpersonal trust enhance performance outcomes and future expectations, while goal congruence has no discernable effect. However, at higher levels of opportunism, goal congruence becomes a more powerful safeguard, while interpersonal trust becomes less effective. Bilateral idiosyncratic investments continue to preserve performance outcomes and future expectations even at higher levels of opportunism. Implications for the long-term management of interorganizational alliances are discussed.