The Public Administration Case against Participation Income
The Public Administration Case against Participation Income
复制标题
针对参与收入的公共行政案例
DOI：
10.1086/520939
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Lindsay Stirton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jurgen De Wispelaere;Lindsay Stirton
安东尼·阿特金森（Anthony Atkinson）的参与收入（PI）提案被誉为无条件基本收入提案的愿望和工作福利模式的政治可接受性之间的可行妥协。本文认为，PI功能差的一些基本的行政任务，任何福利计划必须执行。这导致了参与收入的三难困境，这表明，PI只能保持其明显的能力，以满足普遍主义和选择主义的福利方法的要求，在对管理人员和福利客户都施加了巨大的负担的代价。因此，PI的主要明显优势，其在福利改革辩论中获得不同派别支持的能力，被证明是虚幻的。
Anthony Atkinson’s proposal for a participation income (PI) has been acclaimed as a workable compromise between the aspirations of unconditional basic income proposals and the political acceptability of the workfare model. This article argues that PI functions poorly in terms of a number of essential administrative tasks that any welfare scheme must perform. This leads to a trilemma of participation income, which suggests that PI can only retain its apparent ability to satisfy the requirements of universalist and selectivist approaches to welfare at the cost of imposing a substantial burden on administrators and welfare clients alike. Consequently, the main apparent strength of PI, its capacity to garner support across different factions within welfare reform debates, is shown to be illusory.