Retailer voluntary investment against a threat of manufacturer encroachment
Retailer voluntary investment against a threat of manufacturer encroachment
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DOI：
10.1007/s11002-021-09575-7
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发表时间：
2020-08
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Jumpei Hamamura;Yusuke Zennyo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jumpei Hamamura;Yusuke Zennyo
为了阐明制造商和零售商之间的供应链合作，本研究研究了零售商进行自愿投资以降低制造商的边际生产成本的模型。除了通过零售商的间接渠道（即制造商侵占）之外，制造商还可以引入直销渠道，但这会削弱零售商的投资积极性。零售商可以利用其自愿投资作为阻止制造商侵犯的手段。我们证明，当零售商的成本降低技术足够有效时，制造商的入侵就会得到战略性遏制。这种战略性侵占威慑鼓励零售商加大投资，但它缩小了消费者选择的渠道种类。当后一种效应压倒前一种效应时，消费者剩余会随着战略性侵犯威慑而下降。
To elucidate supply chain cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer, this study examines a model in which the retailer makes voluntary investments to reduce the marginal production cost of the manufacturer. The manufacturer is allowed to introduce a direct selling channel in addition to the indirect channel through the retailer (i.e., manufacturer encroachment), which however dampens the retailers’ investment incentives. The retailer can leverage its voluntary investments as a means of deterring manufacturer encroachment. We demonstrate that manufacturer encroachment is strategically deterred when the retailer’s cost-reduction technology is sufficiently effective. This strategic encroachment deterrence encourages the retailer to invest more, but it narrows the variety of channels from which consumers can select. When the latter effect dominates the former effect, consumer surplus declines with strategic encroachment deterrence.