Partial Vertical Integration, Risk Shifting, and Product Rejection in the High-Value Export Supply Chain : The Ghana Pineapple Sector

Partial Vertical Integration, Risk Shifting, and Product Rejection in the High-Value Export Supply Chain : The Ghana Pineapple Sector
复制标题

高价值出口供应链中的部分垂直整合、风险转移和产品拒绝:加纳菠萝行业

DOI:
10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.007
复制
发表时间:
2011
期刊:
影响因子:
6.9
通讯作者:
and R.J.Sexton
and R.J.Sexton
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Suzuki;A.;L.S.Jarvis;and R.J.Sexton

文献摘要

相似文献

高价值出口供应链具有改善小农福利的潜力,但其相对的生产效率低下和道德风险问题可能导致出口商倾向于垂直整合的种植园生产。然而,加纳的菠萝出口商既为自己生产,也从小农那里购买。我们假设垂直整合只是部分的,因为出口商面临着小农更有能力吸收的巨大市场风险。我们的经验表明,出口商对出口质量水果的平均拒收率很高,并且随着欧洲需求的意外波动而变化。这些结果支持假设,并与部分垂直整合理论一致,但不符合标准的委托-代理范式。
High-value export supply chains hold potential to improve smallholders’ welfare, but their relative production inefficiency and moral hazard problems can cause exporters to prefer vertically integrated plantation production. However, pineapple exporters in Ghana produce both for their own account and purchase from smallholders. We hypothesize that vertical integration is only partial because exporters face large market risks that smallholders, surprisingly, are better able to absorb. We show empirically that exporters’ average rejection rate of export-quality fruit is high and varies in response to unanticipated fluctuations in European demand. These results support the hypothesis and are consistent with theories of partial vertical integration but not the standard principal-agent paradigm.