Success through Confidence: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Side-Channel Attack
Success through Confidence: Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Side-Channel Attack
复制标题
信心带来成功：评估侧信道攻击的有效性
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thomas Roche
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Adrian Thillard;E. Prouff;Thomas Roche
侧信道攻击通常采用分而治之的策略，分别恢复秘密的不同部分。它们在实践中的效率取决于对手准确评估每一次追回行动成功与否的能力。这使得攻击成功率的研究成为侧信道分析中的一个中心问题。在本文中，我们解决这个问题在两个不同的设置最流行的攻击，即相关功率分析（CPA）。在第一种设置中，我们假设目标子密钥是已知的，并且我们比较了将成功率表示为泄漏噪声和加密原语的代数属性的函数的最新公式。我们还将这些公式与Fei等人最近在CHES 2012上的工作联系起来。在第二种设置中，子密钥不再被假设为已知的，我们引入了攻击结果的置信度的概念，允许研究不同的攻击策略。通过实验，我们表明，可以利用子密钥假设的秩演化来计算比只考虑最终结果更好的置信度。
Side-channel attacks usually apply a divide-and-conquer strategy, separately recovering different parts of the secret. Their efficiency in practice relies on the adversary ability to precisely assess the success or unsuccess of each of these recoveries. This makes the study of the attack success rate a central problem in side channel analysis. In this paper we tackle this issue in two different settings for the most popular attack, namely the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). In the first setting, we assume that the targeted subkey is known and we compare the state of the art formulae expressing the success rate as a function of the leakage noise and the algebraic properties of the cryptographic primitive. We also make the link between these formulae and the recent work of Fei et al. at CHES 2012. In the second setting, the subkey is no longer assumed to be known and we introduce the notion of confidence level in an attack result, allowing for the study of different heuristics. Through experiments, we show that the rank evolution of a subkey hypothesis can be exploited to compute a better confidence than considering only the final result.