Food Protection for Sale
Food Protection for Sale
复制标题
食品保护出售
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9396.2006.00630.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Xenia Matschke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Lopez;Xenia Matschke
本文使用1978年至1992年美国食品加工业在不同进口需求规格下的详细数据来检验保护销售(PFS)模型。所有的实证结果都定性地支持了PFS模型的预测和以往的实证工作。虽然福利权重对进口需求规范非常敏感，但一个令人惊讶的结果是，我们使用进口斜率或源自国内需求和供给函数的弹性系数，获得了国内福利的权重在2.6到3.6之间。相比之下，基于直接指定进口需求(包括阿明顿模型)的进口斜率或弹性的结果，通常会产生对国内福利权重的不切实际的巨大估计。我们认为，后一种经验悖论的产生主要是因为对于进口比率较低和/或进口价格相对波动导致的估计弹性或斜率较低的行业，解释变量往往非常大。使用导出的导入参数的结果表明，在PFS模型中，竞选捐款的作用比之前发现的要强得多。他们还表明，常用的阿明顿估计可能不适合估计PFS模型。
This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter empirical paradox arises mainly because the explanatory variables tend to be extremely large for industries with low import ratios and/or low estimated elasticities or slopes resulting from relatively volatile import prices. The results with derived import parameters point to a much stronger role of campaign contributions within the PFS model than previously found. They also suggest that the commonly-used Armington estimates may not be appropriate for estimating the PFS model.