Price and quantity competition in network goods duopoly: a reversal result
Price and quantity competition in network goods duopoly: a reversal result
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网络商品双头垄断中的价格和数量竞争：逆转结果
作者：
Rupayan Pal
本文回顾了古诺均衡和贝特朗均衡的经典利润排序，以及产品市场竞争战略变量的内生选择问题，但对于网络产品双寡头垄断。它表明，在强网络外部性和不完全替代商品的情况下(a)经典的利润排序是颠倒的——每个企业在贝特朗竞争下比在古诺竞争下获得更高的利润；(b)企业在价格合同和数量合同之间进行选择时面临囚徒困境类型的情况，并以帕累托劣等结果结束，这与标准的非网络商品双寡头垄断的情况不同。
This paper revisits the classic profit-ranking of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria and the issue of endogenous choice of strategic variables for product market competition, but for a network goods duopoly. It demonstrates that in the case of strong network externalities and imperfect-substitute goods (a) the classic profit-ranking is reversed - each firm earns higher profit under Bertrand competition than that under Cournot competition and (b) firms face a prisoners' dilemma type of situation while choosing between a price contract and a quantity contract and end up with Pareto inferior outcomes, unlike as in the case of standard non-network goods duopoly.