Dynamic resource allocation in fuzzy coalitions: a game theoretic model
Dynamic resource allocation in fuzzy coalitions: a game theoretic model
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DOI：
10.1007/s10700-013-9172-y
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发表时间：
2013-11
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
S. Borkotokey;Rupok Neog
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Borkotokey;Rupok Neog
在具有模糊联盟的合作博弈框架下，引入了一种高效、动态的资源分配机制（合作模糊博弈）。资源分配问题中的模糊联盟可以定义为其中参与者的成员等级与其总资源的比例成正比。我们把玩家在规定数量的联盟、模糊联盟结构和每个成员等级（相当于总资源的一部分）中所拥有的任何资源分配称为资源投资。研究表明，在合作模式下，资源投入受到参与者对更好绩效的满意度的影响。我们的模型是基于现实生活情境，即一个或多个玩家可能会在资源投资上做出妥协，以帮助形成联盟。
We introduce an efficient and dynamic resource allocation mechanism within the framework of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions (cooperative fuzzy game). A fuzzy coalition in a resource allocation problem can be so defined that membership grades of the players in it are proportional to the fractions of their total resources. We call any distribution of the resources possessed by the players, among a prescribed number of coalitions, a fuzzy coalition structure and every membership grade (equivalently fraction of the total resources), a resource investment. It is shown that this resource investment is influenced by the satisfaction of the players in regard to better performance under a cooperative setup. Our model is based on the real life situations, where possibly one or more players compromise on their resource investments in order to help forming coalitions.