Necessity and Apriority
Necessity and Apriority
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必要性和优先性
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发表时间：
2007
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通讯作者：
Gordon Barnes
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文献类型：
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作者：
Gordon Barnes
莱布尼茨和康德所捍卫的必然性与先验性之间关系的经典观点是，所有必要的真理都是先验已知的。自从索尔·克里普克（Saul Kripke）和希拉里·普特南（Hilary Putnam）发现存在一些只能后验得知的必然真理以来，经典观点现在几乎被普遍拒绝。然而，近年来，关于这些必要的后验真理的认识论出现了新的争论。根据一种观点——称之为新古典观点——必然真理的知识总是依赖于至少一项先验知识。根据相反的观点——称之为新经验主义观点——我们对必然性的认识有时是广泛的经验性的。在本文中，我提出并捍卫了反对新经验主义观点的论点。我认为，关于必然真理的必要性的知识不可能是广泛的经验知识。
The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view – call it the neo-classical view – knowledge of a necessary truth always depends on at least one item of a priori knowledge. According to the rival view – call it the neoempiricist view – our knowledge of necessity is sometimes broadly empirical. In this paper I present and defend an argument against the neo-empiricist view. I argue that knowledge of the necessity of a necessary truth could not be broadly empirical.