Egoist's Dilemma: A DEA Game
Egoist's Dilemma: A DEA Game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.omega.2004.08.003
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发表时间：
2003-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ken Nakabayashi;K. Tone
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ken Nakabayashi;K. Tone
本文研究了在个体或组织具有多种绩效评价标准的情况下，个体或组织之间达成共识的问题；从某种意义上说，每个玩家都坚持自己在标准上的优势。我们在数据包络分析（DEA）中开发的框架或概念中分析这种情况。这就导致了一种被称为“利己主义者的困境”的困境。我们用合作博弈论来研究这个困境，并提出一个解决方案。本文开发的方案也可以应用于实现公平的成本分配以及收益-成本分配。
This paper deals with problems of consensus-making among individuals or organizations with multiple criteria for evaluating their performance when the players are supposed to be egoistic; in the sense that each player sticks to his superiority regarding the criteria. We analyze this situation within the framework or concept developed in data envelopment analysis (DEA). This leads to a dilemma called the `egoist's dilemma'. We examine this dilemma using cooperative game theory and propose a solution. The scheme developed in this paper can also be applied to attaining fair cost allocations as well as benefit–cost distributions.