Biased managers with network externalities
Biased managers with network externalities
复制标题
具有网络外部性的有偏见的管理者
DOI：
10.1111/sjpe.12340
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Lee Ki‐Dong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Choi Kangsik;Lee DongJoon;Lee Ki‐Dong
在古诺和贝特朗竞争的网络行业中，我们考察了企业所有者雇佣具有不正确市场需求的有偏见的管理者时的模型。与以往的研究相比，我们发现(i)无论消费者形成响应性和被动预期时网络外部性的强度如何，在古诺和贝特朗竞争下，所有者通过雇佣有偏见的经理来实现战略优势，使其更具侵略性；（ii）在贝特朗和古诺竞争下，企业更愿意面对弱网络外部性的被动预期，反之亦然。(3)当网络规模足够大时，在两种竞争模式下，企业雇佣激进管理者的囚徒困境将不复存在。在没有委托的情况下，在古诺和贝特朗竞争下，我们得到了企业利润的不同排名，这取决于网络外部性和期望的形成。
In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition.