Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly
Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly
复制标题
非对称寡头垄断下的战略投资补贴
DOI：
10.1111/rode.12098
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Naoto Jinji;Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu
本文研究了国际寡头垄断中的战略投资补贴问题。建立了一个一般的寡头垄断模型，在该模型中，企业竞争分为两个阶段，政府承诺在企业行动之前进行投资补贴。本文认为，企业之间的不对称性产生于他们生产的产品的性质，而不是他们的成本结构。当企业生产非对称差异化产品时，发现外国竞争者数量的变化可能会改变最优单边投资补贴的符号。在为质量差异化产业提供战略研究和开发补贴的情况下，提供了一个政策逆转的例子。
This paper examines strategic investment subsidies in an international oligopoly. A general oligopoly model is constructed in which firms compete in two stages and governments commit to investment subsidies prior to firms' actions. The paper considers asymmetry among firms that arises from the nature of goods they produce rather than their cost structures. When firms produce asymmetrically differentiated goods, it is found that a change in the number of foreign competitors may alter the sign of the optimal unilateral investment subsidy. An example of policy reversal is provided in the case of strategic research and development subsidies for a quality‐differentiated industry.