A Two-Dimensional Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Access
A Two-Dimensional Sybil-Proof Mechanism for Dynamic Spectrum Access
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DOI：
10.1109/tmc.2022.3200044
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发表时间：
2023-11-01
影响因子：
7.9
通讯作者：
Liu, Jia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dong, Xuewen;You, Zhichao;Liu, Jia
为了提高频谱利用率，基于拍卖的机制已被认为是动态频谱接入（DSA）中的一种流行工具。最近，基于拍卖的DSA机制中的Sybil攻击已经被研究，其中作弊的投标人可以通过使用多个假身份提交投标来操纵拍卖。DSA中现有的Sybil证明机制仅限于防止来自主用户（PU）或次用户（SU）的Sybil攻击。然而，PU和SU都可以在DSA中执行Sybil攻击，即，两次袭击茜玻解决双重Sybil攻击的挑战是，虚构的身份和虚假的投标可以直接影响分配结果，但恶意投标人不能直接区分所有投标人。为了抵抗双重Sybil攻击，我们提出了第一个双重Sybil证明的二维真实频谱拍卖机制STEAM。具体而言，STEAM根据地理特征合并可疑买家，并通过与出价无关的排序方法对卖家进行排序，以最大限度地减少不真实出价和Sybil攻击对分配结果的影响。理论分析和广泛的评估表明，STEAM具有双重Sybil防错、二维真实、个体理性和公平平衡等特点，与现有的基于拍卖的机制相比，各项指标的性能损失在8%以内。
Achieving higher spectrum utilization, auction-based mechanisms has been regarded as a popular tool in dynamic spectrum access (DSA). Recently, Sybil attacks in auction-based DSA mechanisms have been investigated, where a cheating bidder can manipulate an auction by submitting bids under multiple fake identities. Existing Sybil-proof mechanisms in DSA are limited to prevent Sybil attacks from primary users (PUs) or secondary users (SUs). However, both of PUs and SUs may perform Sybil attacks in DSA, i.e., double Sybil attacks. The challenge of solving the double Sybil attacks is that fictitious identities and fake bids can directly affect allocation results, but the malicious bidders cannot be straightforwardly distinguished from all bidders. To resist the double Sybil attacks, we propose STEAM, the first double Sybil-proof and two-dimensional Truthful spEctrum Auction Mechanism for DSA. Specifically, STEAM merges suspicious buyers based on geographic characteristics and sorts sellers by a bid-independent sorting method to minimize the impact of untruthful bids and Sybil attacks on the allocation results. Theoretical analysis and extensive evaluations prove that STEAM is double Sybil-proof, two-dimensional truthful, individual rational and budget-balanced, while the performance loss in various metrics within 8% compared to the existing auction-based mechanisms.