Efficiency of joint enterprises with internal bargaining
Efficiency of joint enterprises with internal bargaining
复制标题
DOI：
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/686
复制
发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
L. Lambertini;Sougata Poddar;D. Sasaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Lambertini;Sougata Poddar;D. Sasaki
在本文中，我们仔细研究这些战略激励的情况下，企业在一个多公司项目中的成本和利润的份额，并为各自的（预先承诺）的成本和利润份额的分割讨价还价。我们建立，当每个公司的努力贡献的共同事业是相互观察（这是经常在密切合作的情况下），因此可以形成的基础上的或有成本和利润分享计划，这不是总的经济效率，但超级/次加性的净回报的努力，直接影响企业的努力贡献的可持续性的配置文件。我们在本文中获得的（在）效率的结果是不同的性质，从所谓的“搭便车”或“团队竞争”的问题：讨价还价的可持续的结果，在precommetted成本和利润的集合。
In this paper we take a close look at those strategic incentives arising in a situation where firms share the costs and profits in a multi-firm project, and bargain for their respective (precommitted) split of cost- and profit-shares. We establish that, when each firm’s effort contribution to the joint undertaking is mutually observable (which is often the case in closely collaborative operations) and hence can form basis of the contingent cost- and profit-sharing scheme, it is not the gross economic efficiency but the super-/sub-additivity of the nett returns from effort that directly affects the sustainability of a profile of firms’ effort contributions. The (in)efficiency result we obtain in this paper is of different nature from so-called “free riding” or “team competition“ problems : the set of sustainable outcomes with bargaining over precommetted cost- and pro…t-shares is generally neither a superset nor a subset of the sustainable set without bargaining.